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Corporate governance, companies’ disclosure practices, and market transparency:  




We examine the link between corporate governance, companies’ disclosure practices and 
their equity market transparency in a study of more than 5,000 listed companies in 23 
countries covering the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008. Our results confirm the 
belief that better-governed firms make more frequent disclosures to the market. We also find 
greater disclosure in common law relative to code law countries. However firms with better 
governance in both code and common law countries make more frequent disclosures. We 
measure market transparency by the timeliness of prices. In contrast to single country studies, 
results show, for the 23 countries collectively, better corporate governance is associated with 
less timely share prices. This would suggest that a firm substitutes better corporate 
governance for transparency. We are thus led to the conclusion that even if information is 
disclosed more frequently by better-governed firms, it does not necessarily follow that 
information is reflected in share prices on a timelier basis. 
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Corporate governance (CG) refers to mechanisms used to help resolve agency problems in 
the firm. They arise from the separation of ownership and control and the fact that contracts, 
between the “owner” (the principal) and the “controller” (the agent), typically are incomplete 
in the sense that they do not cover all future possibilities (Hart, 1995). The form of CG differs 
across firms and countries, and is influenced by the firms’ various stakeholders including 
institutional investors, shareholders, managers and debt holders. It is commonly believed that 
better-governed firms disclose more information to external parties and are more transparent 
due to greater monitoring. We would therefore expect better-governed firms to be associated 
with more frequent and more timely disclosures, other things being equal. 
Firm level CG is influenced by overall institutional frameworks in place at the country level, 
such as the level of shareholder protection and enforcement of legal requirements. In this 
connection, La Porta et al. (1998) conclude common law countries provide greater investor 
protection. CG structures in common law countries are expected to be more effective in 
encouraging corporate disclosure to the equity market, because any failure to disclose 
information that ought to be disclosed to shareholders is more likely to be detected and 
penalised. Furthermore, the threat of a penalty being imposed on the firm or its board for non-
disclosure may well be reinforced by the behaviour of managers who are concerned about 
their own reputation. Thus we expect to find higher standards of disclosure and increased 
timeliness of information flows in countries with greater investor protection. 
We examine whether the firm’s disclosure policies and the timeliness with which value-
relevant information is captured in its stock price are related to the type of investor protection 
provided in the country in which the firm is domiciled and by its particular governance 




example, Aman et al., 2011; Beekes and Brown, 2006, hereafter BB06; Beekes et al., 2012; 
Hass et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2014). The relative influence of CG on firms’ disclosure and 
transparency across countries is an important question given the inter-connectedness of 
financial markets and the renewed emphasis on the need for good CG, particularly following 
the global financial crisis (OECD, 2009).  
We contribute to a growing literature on CG and disclosure in the following ways. First, we 
conduct our study on a cross country basis over a number of years, providing the ability to 
jointly consider the role of the individual firm’s CG, and shareholders’ rights and the threat of 
litigation in the firm’s home country. We thereby add to the literature regarding the relevance 
of CG at the country level, litigation pressures and the role of investor protection. Second, we 
build on prior work (Beekes and Brown, 2006; Aman et al., 2011; Beekes et al., 2012, 2015) 
by expanding their models and estimating the association between CG, and the frequency and 
timeliness of disclosure in an international setting. By not focussing on a particular year, 
country or industry, our results should be more generalizable.  
We investigate the relationship between investor protection, ‘better’ CG and three main 
measures of informativeness: the number of documents released to the stock exchange (as in 
BB06); the timeliness of those disclosures (Beekes and Brown, 2007); and the speed with 
which value relevant information is incorporated into share prices (BB06).2 The first two 
measures focus on the information flows from the firm to the share market and exclude any 
other news sources. The third measure reflects the share market’s response to value-relevant 
information from all sources.3 We study 23 OECD countries, incorporating a range of CG 
                                                            
2 By ‘better’ CG we are referring to the firm achieving a higher rating according to an identified measure of CG. 
3 Our measures examine the timeliness of information flows (in terms of company releases and share prices). 
This is distinct from asymmetric earnings timeliness in the Basu (1997) sense. A study of a sample of Australian 





practices and alternative investor protection regimes, for which we have CG data from 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Our CG dataset includes the period 1 January 2003 
to 31 December 2008 and encompasses a variety of measures which either are important for 
effective CG according to prior research or have been included in CG codes. The size and 
composition of the board of directors and its committees are examples of these measures. 
Our results show CG does make a difference: better CG is associated with a greater number 
of disclosures, which are released to the stock market on a more timely basis relative to 
releases by other firms. Also, where there are higher levels of investor protection, better CG 
is associated with increased timeliness of bad news documents. However, in relation to the 
timeliness of price discovery, we find better CG is associated with less timely price 
discovery. 
Our paper is related to Yu (2011), who investigates share price informativeness by evaluating 
stock return variation and earnings response coefficients for 22 countries for the period 2002 
to 2005. Yu finds there is greater informativeness for better-governed firms, irrespective of 
the legal origin of the country. In contrast, we find greater overall disclosure levels are not 
matched by faster price discovery for better-governed firms. Additional analysis suggests this 
could be related to information processing issues: better-governed firms that release fewer 
documents to the stock exchange are associated with more timely price discovery in countries 
with greater investor protection. Compared with Yu (2011), we use a more comprehensive 
measure of CG, incorporating 24 specific governance provisions (discussed in more detail in 
section 3.1), and we include all industrial sectors thereby increasing the generalizability of 
results.4 We use more direct measures of informativeness, focusing on the frequency and 
                                                            
4 Yu (2011) uses seven of the ISS CG characteristics in her measure of CG as shown in Appendix Table A.2, 




timing of the firm’s disclosures, and the speed of price discovery in relation to information 
ultimately reflected in prices when the year’s financial results are released. We believe these 
measures are key indicators of the firm’s equity market transparency.  
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses; 
Sections 3 and 4 summarise the data and research methods; Section 5 contains the results 
from the documents and price analysis; Section 6 summarises robustness testing; Section 7 
deals with the possibility of endogeneity; and Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 The Principal-Agent Relationship  
Principal-agent theory examines the relationship between principals (e.g., a firm’s owners or 
shareholders) and agents (e.g., the firm’s CEO). The agent is assumed to be self-interested 
and act opportunistically at the expense of the principal’s best interests (Hart, 1995). A 
problem inherent in the principal-agent relationship is that the principal cannot observe all of 
the agent’s actions. In other words, some of the agent’s actions are hidden from the principal, 
resulting in information asymmetry in the corporate setting between shareholders and 
managers. Given this the manager may pursue their own interest at the expense of 
shareholders’ wealth, such as by consuming excessive perquisites, or by empire building. The 
principal can restrict this divergent behaviour by providing the manager with incentives (e.g., 
share options) and incurring monitoring costs (such as periodic audit of the firm’s financial 
statements by an external auditor). On the other hand the agent may also incur some bonding 
costs to reassure the principal of their good intentions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
specifically focusses on items which could influence firm transparency. In addition, Yu excludes regulated 




The rights of the respective parties in the relationship may be specified in a contract between 
them. Because such a contract inevitably is incomplete (Hart, 1995) and the enforcement of a 
contract is costly anyway (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 1983b), CG has a role to play: it provides 
a framework for resolving matters not fully specified in the contract. As one example, the 
board of directors can play a role in “monitor[ing] and ratify[ing] important decisions” of the 
manager (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p. 311). 
2.2 What is Corporate Governance? 
The OECD principles define CG as the “set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. CG also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined” (OECD, 2004, p.11). While 
there is no clearly defined theory of CG (Larcker et al., 2007), there are some widely agreed 
elements to good CG, such as the protection of shareholder rights, the equitable treatment of 
shareholders, good disclosure practices and firm transparency, and an effective board 
(OECD, 2004). In practice, CG is shaped by the various stakeholders of the firm, such as 
controlling shareholders (e.g. individuals, family members, or other companies with 
substantial shareholdings or cross holdings) who may exert substantial influence on the firm’s 
decision making. A second example is institutional investors, who have been shown to 
influence firms’ governance structures (Wu, 2004). The existence of external creditors 
provides additional monitoring of the firm (Hart, 1995).  
The overall legal and institutional framework of a country influences CG and investor 
protection. Investor protection is important as it constrains the ability of controlling 
shareholders to expropriate the rights of minority shareholders and creditors (La Porta et al., 




of their enforcement are important aspects of CG (La Porta et al., 1998). However, the quality 
of a country’s legal protection of minority shareholders and the enforcement of the law differ 
across the world (La Porta et al., 1998). In code law countries, laws are made by legislation, 
although when interpreting the law “judges are not supposed to go beyond the statutes and 
apply … fairness opinions,” (La Porta et al, 2000, p.9). Therefore circumventing the rules to 
expropriate the rights of investors may be feasible in a code law country if the method used is 
not strictly prohibited. In common law countries, legal rules are based upon general 
principles and fairness, and consequently they result in greater investor protection. There is 
also greater litigation risk in common law countries because it is more likely that disclosure 
requirements will be enforced (La Porta et al., 1998); managers therefore have greater 
incentives to meet the disclosure needs of investors (Hung, 2001). Countries with strong 
protection of minority investors tend to have more highly developed stock markets, better CG 
and higher firm valuation (La Porta et al., 2000; 2002). Agency problems are more prevalent 
in weak investor protection environments as dominant shareholders can more easily 
expropriate benefits from minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2002). 
The Anglo-Saxon model of CG, typical in common law countries, highlights the interests and 
rights of shareholders. In contrast the stakeholder model of CG, typical in code law countries, 
involves major contracting parties (banks, customers, suppliers) being represented on the 
boards of individual firms and also shareholdings tend to be concentrated (e.g., among 
banks). These close relationships between the firm’s managers and its major stakeholders are 
likely to resolve many of the problems of information asymmetry and reduce the free rider 
issue which is typical when there is dispersed ownership, as in the Anglo-Saxon model of 
CG. These differences are likely to impact on firms’ disclosure policies and overall 




2.3 The Role of Disclosure 
Theory suggests the use of timely and transparent information flows to the firm’s 
shareholders on a regular basis reduces information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2004) and improves the ability of shareholders to monitor 
management’s activities (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). It also facilitates signalling a firm’s 
quality to current and potential investors (Akerlof, 1970). Disclosure can provide reassurance 
to investors, resulting in benefits such as a reduced cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997; 
Sengupta and Zhang, 2015) or lower cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998). In addition, firms which 
disclose more information may experience an increase in analyst following due to the lower 
information processing costs, leading to an increase in the stock’s liquidity (Healy et al., 
1999). Therefore firms have incentives for disclosure irrespective of any market regulation 
that requires it.  
There are of course limits. Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) show additional disclosure is not 
always optimal for a firm and may lead to additional agency problems; for example, 
monitoring by shareholders made possible through additional disclosures may be 
accompanied by additional compensation to managers if management has bargaining power 
in the relationship. Also disclosure can be costly to the firm; it can reveal information which 
could be detrimental to the firm’s competitive position (Verrecchia, 1983) or managers may 
reveal some private information which they would prefer for opportunistic reasons to keep 
private (Kothari et al., 2009). 
The differing models of CG (discussed in section 2.2) have implications for a firm’s 
disclosure policies and the timeliness of information flows; higher levels of information 




investors informed. However, due to the close relationships in a stakeholder model of CG, it 
is possible that even if fewer disclosures are made, information is revealed on a timely basis 
to stakeholders via other mechanisms.  
2.4 Corporate Governance Codes and International Disclosure Standards 
Many CG codes focus on transparency and disclosure.5 The OECD principles of CG (2004), 
which are an international guide for good governance practice, specifically mention firm 
transparency and disclosure as a means to “discipline market participants and to promote 
accountability” (OECD, 2004, p.30). The OECD principles state: 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the 
financial situation, performance, ownership and governance of the company 
(OECD, 2004, p.22) [Emphasis added]. 
These sentiments are echoed in the International CG Network’s Global CG principles 
(International CG Network, 2009, p. 21). Individual country CG codes and guidelines have 
often originated as a response to major corporate failures or scandals which have involved a 
lack of transparency or poor management of companies (for example, Maxwell and the 
Cadbury Code in the UK and Enron, Worldcom and Sarbanes-Oxley in the USA, to name but 
a few examples) so their focus on disclosure is understandable.  
CG guidelines often mention the need for corporate disclosures to be timely, accurate and 
balanced, and accessible to all investors. Examples of this exist for individual country CG 
codes with code and common law origins. For example, Principle 5 of the Australian Stock 
Exchange Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good Governance (2003; p. 35) 
states: 
                                                            
5 For example the Belgium CG Code states: “disclosure is essential for CG and crucial to allow effective outside 




…the company must put in place mechanisms designed to ensure … [that] all 
investors have equal and timely access to material information concerning the 
company – including its financial situation, performance, ownership and 
governance [and] company announcements are factual and presented in a clear 
and balanced way. “Balance” requires disclosure of both positive and negative 
information.[Emphasis added] 
In Japan, the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s CG principle 4 states:  
Corporate governance for listed companies should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is conducted on all material matters including the financial condition, 
performance results and ownership distribution… For this purpose, shareholders 
require periodic, reliable and comparable information sufficient to evaluate the 
operational conditions of businesses by the management, and further timely 
disclosure regarding material events taking place during the intervals between 
periodic disclosures. Such disclosure shall be conducted simultaneously to ensure 
equal treatment of shareholders (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2009; p.9). [Emphasis 
added] 
The International Ongoing Disclosure Standards published by the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) emphasises the importance of “reliable, timely and 
readily accessible information…[which should be] fairly presented, not be misleading or 
deceptive and contain no material omission of information,” (IOSCO, 2002, pp.2, 6). It also 
states that there should be equal treatment of disclosures and they should be accessible to all 
stakeholders. These requirements apply to all listed entities in all jurisdictions irrespective of 
their regulatory approach to disclosure.6 
                                                            
6 In broad terms there are two approaches to disclosure regulation. In the prescriptive approach (used in the USA 
and Japan) rules are provided to indicate what must be disclosed (for further details see IOSCO, 2002, p. 7 – 
11). In other jurisdictions there is a general obligation to disclose price sensitive information which would 




Taking all of this together, there seems to be a general presumption among those who issue 
CG codes that improving the governance of firms will result in disclosures that are more 
frequent and more informative, and firms that are more transparent.  
2.5 Corporate Governance and Disclosure Frequency 
While there are reasons to predict better CG is associated with greater firm disclosure, 
following La Porta et al. (2000) there are also reasons to believe the influence of firm specific 
CG on disclosure varies with the degree of investor protection offered in the country. Doidge 
et al. (2007) suggest country-level mechanisms may be more important in shaping firm 
behaviour rather than firm-level choices, because if the legal environment is weak then the 
firm is less able to credibly commit to better CG. Given the greater incentives for disclosure 
in common law countries due to greater protection of investor rights and more strict 
enforcement of laws, combined with greater monitoring in firms with better CG, we predict:  
Hypothesis 1: The firm’s CG is positively associated with the frequency of releases of 
documents to the stock exchange, and the influence of CG is greater in countries with 
stronger investor protection. 
2.6 Corporate Governance and the Timeliness of Information 
In addition to the frequency of disclosures (measured, e.g., by the number of disclosures 
made over the course of a year), another important characteristic for information to be useful 
is its timeliness, or how soon it is released. Timely information is emphasised in CG codes 
and by stock market providers (e.g., Toronto Stock Exchange, 2004) and regulators (OECD, 
2004; IOSCO, 2002). We distinguish two types of timeliness: the timeliness of documents 
(i.e. how soon documents are released to the firm’s home exchange) and the timeliness of the 




of a news item’s release may be opportunistically influenced by the firm’s manager (Brown 
et al., 2012; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Kothari et al., 2009). Indeed prior empirical work 
finds a link between timeliness and good CG. For example, Beekes et al. (2015) find more 
timely price discovery among better-governed Australian firms.7 In addition to the firm’s CG, 
litigation pressure (Sengupta, 2004) and a desire to protect exposed parties against potential 
litigation costs (Skinner, 1994) may influence disclosure timeliness. Given the greater 
likelihood of litigation and greater enforcement of laws in common law countries, we predict:  
Hypothesis 2: The firm’s CG is positively associated with the timeliness of document 
releases to the stock exchange, and the influence of CG is greater in countries with 
stronger investor protection. 
Hypothesis 3: The firm’s CG is positively associated with the timeliness of price 
discovery, and the influence of CG is greater in countries with stronger investor 
protection. 
Note that, in our models, timeliness is reverse coded such that a negative coefficient, which 
reduces the predicted value of the dependent variable, is to be interpreted as increasing the 
timeliness of information; i.e., it takes less time to release or incorporate new information. 
3. Data 
Our primary sample consists of firms with financial years ending between 1 January 2003 
and 31 December 2008 that are covered by the ISS USA and Global CG databases.8 We 
                                                            
7 However a study of Japanese firms found less timely price discovery for better-governed firms (Aman et al., 
2011). In further analysis, they find more traditional forms of CG in Japan (bank ownership, close shareholdings 
and insider membership of the board directors) are associated with more timely price discovery and greater 
transparency. To incorporate their findings into our research, we include close shareholdings as an explanatory 
variable. 
8 USA firms are covered by ISS if they appear in any of the following indices: Standard and Poors (S&P) 500, 
S&P Mid-Cap 400, S&P Small-Cap 600, Russell 3000 (ISS, 2005). This criterion results in more USA firms 
being covered and a greater diversity in their size. Only larger firms are included in the Global dataset (i.e. non-




exclude South Korea from our sample as ISS sample coverage is limited to 2007 and 2008. 
Financial and industrial sector data is collected from a variety of sources, detailed below, 
yielding a sample of 7,541 firm-year observations relating to 2,078 unique firms in 18 
countries for the document analysis, and 26,126 firm-year observations relating to 5,859 
unique firms in 23 countries for the price analysis (see Table 1).9 Details of our variables and 
data sources are shown in Appendix Table A:1. 
 
XX TABLE 1 XX 
 
3.1 Measuring Corporate Governance, Close Ownership and Investor Protection 
For individual firm level CG, we use ISS CG data. ISS CG data is recorded in such a way 
that firms meeting ‘minimum standards’ of governance (as determined by ISS) are identified 
and their data compiled on a comparable basis across all countries covered by the dataset. 
Rather than using the metric calculated by ISS to measure CG, the usefulness of which, for 
research purposes, has been questioned in the literature (Daines et al., 2010),10 we use the 
underlying CG data to generate an index of CG. Following Chung et al., 2010, we use a 
measure of CG with 24 underlying governance characteristics “which are closely related to 
financial and operational transparency” (Chung et al., 2010, p.268; see Appendix Table A:2 
for details).  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Far East (MSCI EAFE) index and for Canada, firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and included in 
S&P’s Composite index (ISS, 2003). 
9There are 528, 1,051, 1,627, 1,659, 1,565 and 1,111 company-level observations for years 2003 to 2008, 
respectively, for the documents sample. For the prices sample there are 3,818, 3,882, 4,492, 4,545, 4,279, and 
5,110 company-level observations again for years 2003 to 2008. 
10 Daines et al. (2010, 460) find that many commercially available CG ratings including those provided by ISS 
have little association with future firm performance and other outcomes relevant to shareholders, and any effect 




This measure of CG includes an assessment of the functioning of the board of directors and 
its committees, directors’ stock ownership and compensation, and provisions in the firm’s 
charter and bylaws relating to take-over. Items 1 – 12 encompass the role of the board of 
directors in monitoring managers and how CG aligns management’s interests with those of 
shareholders. Variables are included to indicate the level of independence of the principal 
board committees (audit, nomination and remuneration). In particular the audit committee 
oversees the firm’s financial reporting and disclosures, and is responsible for monitoring the 
internal audit and independent external audit process.11 The existence of such structures 
should reduce the likelihood of accounting misstatements, and improve overall disclosure and 
transparency. A measure of board size is included as smaller boards are thought to be more 
effective (Yermack, 1996).  
Other measures relate to directors’ share ownership and compensation (items 20 to 23); they 
are included as they can be used by firms to align managers’ interests with those of the 
shareholders, and to reduce managers’ incentives to take actions which would reduce firm 
value (Core and Larcker, 2002). The guidelines firms use for executives and directors specify 
minimum levels of ownership and limit the quantity of shares which can be sold, providing 
some assurance of the effectiveness of the directors’ ownership in resolving agency conflict. 
Finally the measure includes features which may delay or prevent takeover activity if they are 
not present such as the rights of shareholders to call meetings and to vote on resolutions, the 
annual election of directors, the absence of a poison pill provision and additional voting 
requirements for amending bylaws or approving mergers. Individual country differences are 
taken into account by ISS when scoring items (ISS, 2003; 2005).12  
                                                            
11 The ISS dataset does not identify the external audit firm, which may be a shortcoming. 
12 To determine a firm’s CG rating, ISS collects CG data from publicly available company disclosure documents 




In the absence of an accepted theory on how to weight the various aspects of CG, we weight 
all aspects equally. A firm scores one point for each characteristic successfully met and zero 
otherwise.13 The total score is divided by 24 and recorded in the form of a percentage score. 
We measure CG as at 31 December each year for every firm in our sample and this data is 
matched to the firm’s financial data, which is drawn from its financial statements of the same 
year.  
The ISS CG dataset has at least two distinct advantages over other CG datasets. First, it uses 
a consistent measure of CG across countries thereby enabling us to examine the relation 
between country characteristics and CG. Second, firms covered in the dataset are generally 
larger firms, which are likely to be more important in their respective countries and to attract 
more interest from institutional investors and analysts.  
In some countries in our study, concentrated ownership among family members or banks is 
common place, which can give rise to agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and 
outside investors (Fan and Wong, 2002). The ISS dataset focuses on the internal CG 
structures of firms (e.g., board and board committees) and does not specifically examine 
external factors, such as the firm’s ownership. To address this issue we include a measure of 
close ownership. We collect data on the percentage of closely held shares, from Worldscope 
(as in Doidge et al., 2007 and Aggarwal et al., 2011). This item includes the shares held by 
officers, directors and their families, shares held in trust, shares held by another company, 
shares held by pension/benefit plans and shares held by individuals who own more than 5% 
of outstanding shares. For Japanese companies this “represents the holdings of the ten largest 
shareholders” (Thomson Financial, 2009, p.31).  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
meet (ISS, 2003). Although ISS has daily files for CG data, our initial analysis confirms many items remain 
unchanged throughout the year, consistent with periodic updating. 
13 In constructing the CG variables, if an item is missing in the current year, we forward fill it with the previous 




As noted, litigation risk and shareholders’ rights in the firm’s home country are likely to 
influence the role of other CG mechanisms. We proxy the level of investor protection and the 
litigation environment by the legal origin of each country (code law or common law), which 
is sourced from La Porta et al. (1998). 
3.2 Other data sources 
Data for company announcements (document releases) are sourced directly from the stock 
exchanges wherever possible although for some countries alternative sources were used as 
the data were unavailable from the stock exchange directly, such as Perfect Information for 
the UK. This data includes all announcements by the firm and provides a comprehensive 
measure of documents released directly to the market.14 While such a measure has the 
limitation that it does not capture intermediate sources such as press items or security 
analysts’ reports, it does have advantages in that it is restricted to the flow of salient 
information emanating from the firm itself and directed to the equity market, and it is 
comparable to measures used in BB06, Aman et al. (2011) and Beekes et al. (2012; 2015). 
We obtain all share-related data (daily share price, return, number of shares outstanding, 
market index return) from Datastream except for the USA, for which the University of 
Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) is the source. The date of the 
annual earnings release, which is used in both the documents and prices analysis, comes from 
a variety of sources (Bloomberg, Reuters, Compustat, Compustat Global, Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and Worldscope) to maximise sample coverage.15 Firm-
level accounting data items (such as total debt, total assets and market capitalisation) are 
                                                            
14 Examples of disclosures made by companies include information regarding acquisitions and takeovers, 
security holdings, periodic reports, quarterly earnings or cash flow reports, capital changes, asset acquisitions or 
disposals and dividend announcements.  
15 We require the release date to be greater than 14 days but less than 180 days from the financial year end date 
to help ensure data integrity. Where we have more than one source of data for the annual earnings release date 




taken from Worldscope except for the USA, for which Compustat is the source. Information 
on cross-listing on a US stock exchange comes from the Bank of New York, US Stock 
exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Commission web sites. Industrial sector is 
defined by the 10 Global Industrial Sector Classification (GICS) groupings. Country-level 
variables are sourced from the 2010 annual report on the Economic Freedom of the World 
(Gwartney et al., 2010), World Development Indicators published by the World Bank, the 
2010 Financial Development and Structure database from the World Bank, cultural variables 
from Hofstede (2015), and the Audit and Enforcement indices of Brown et al. (2014).16  
4. Method 
4.1 Model 
The model in Eq. (1) below tests whether a firm’s disclosure (or timeliness) differs by 
country as a function of the country’s investor protection environment and the firm’s CG, 
plus a set of variables which may affect information flows. We estimate Eq. (1) using pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods with standard errors clustered by firm. For brevity, 
the industry and year fixed effects are not reported in the tables. 
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൅଼ܩ݋݋݀	ܰ݁ݓݏ௜௧ ൅ ଽܵ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ ଵ଴ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜௧ 
൅ଵଵܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜௧ ൅ ઻܆࢏࢚ ൅ ߝ௜௧																																																ሺ1ሻ 
                                                            
16 All of the country-level variables vary by year except for the Audit and Enforcement Indices from Brown et 
al. (2014) which are for 2002, 2005 and 2008 (which we match as appropriate to sample years) and the cultural 
variables from Hofstede (2015), which are time invariant. The 2010 version of the Financial Development and 
Structure database is available to download from 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20696167~page
PK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html. Economic Freedom of the World annual reports are 





where DepVar is a measure of document count or timeliness (detailed below), CG is a 
measure of CG as described in section 3.1, Closeheld is the percentage of close ownership 
(by family, directors, companies and other individuals who own over 5 per cent of share 
capital) as defined by Worldscope, Common is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is 
domiciled in a country of Common Law legal origin according to La Porta et al. (1998) and 
zero otherwise, Crosslist is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is cross-listed on a US 
stock exchange for firms not domiciled in the USA and zero otherwise, and Common·CG, 
Common·Closeheld and Crosslist·CG are interaction terms. Good News is an indicator 
variable which takes the value of one when the firm’s share price outperforms the firm’s 
domestic market index over the year and zero otherwise, as in BB06,17 Size is measured by 
the natural log of market capitalisation in USD at the end of the financial year, Leverage is 
measured by year-end total debt divided by total assets, as in Aggarwal et al. (2011), and 
Volatility is calculated from daily log returns in the 90 days prior to the first day of the 
measurement period for the document count, as in Beekes et al. (2015). ܆	 is a set of eight 
country-level variables (detailed below), with coefficients represented by ઻, and ߝ is the error 
term. i indexes the firm and t the year. Models are fitted with year and industry sector fixed 
effects although for convenience they are not shown in Eq. (1). We exclude country 
indicators from Eq. (1) because it includes other country-level variables, such as Common, 
which do not vary over time. 
The primary coefficients of interest are ଵ, ଷ and ସ.	The coefficient on CG (ଵሻ	captures 
the influence of better-CG for a firm in a low investor protection environment (a code law 
country). The coefficient on Common (ଷሻ captures the fixed effect of a stronger investor 
                                                            
17 We acknowledge company events such as mergers, acquisitions, share issues etc. are likely to impact on firm 





protection regime. The coefficient on Common·CG (ସሻ	captures the incremental effect of 
better CG in a stronger investor protection regime relative to a better-governed firm in a low 
protection regime. We also examine the effects of close ownership, reflected in the relevant 
coefficients (ଶሻ and (ହሻ. The coefficient on Closeheld (ଶሻ captures the effect of close 
ownership for a firm in a low investor protection regime. The coefficient on 
Common·Closeheld (ହሻ	captures the incremental effect of close ownership in a stronger 
investor protection regime.  
4.2 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in our study focus on corporate disclosures to equity markets and on 
share market transparency, which we proxy by the speed of price discovery. To obtain the 
document count measures we count the number of individual firm disclosure documents filed 
with the firm’s home stock exchange over the 365 days ending on the firm’s annual earnings 
release date, denoted day 0 in the documents analysis, as in BB06 and Beekes et al. (2015). 
All documents released by the firm are counted regardless of whether another document was 
released on that day.18 The dependent variable is the log of the document count (Ldocs).  
To measure the timeliness of price discovery, we use the BB06 metric adapted to calendar 
time as in Beekes et al. (2015). The price series is forward-filled (price is brought forward 
from the previous day if the stock is not traded that day). This metric traces the share price 
over 365 calendar days ending 14 days after the firm’s annual earnings announcement, which 
                                                            
18 To eliminate the possibility of incomplete or unreliable data, we impose the criterion that the firm must make 
at least five announcements during the year to be included in the sample. Imposition of this criterion results in 





is the primary statement of the year’s financial results.19 Specifically, the timeliness of prices 
(T) is given by Eq. (2): 
ܶ ൌ ሺሺ∑ | logሺ ଴ܲሻ െ logሺ ௧ܲሻ|	௧ୀିଵ௧ୀିଷ଺ହ ሻ െ 0.5ሻ/365	                    (2) 
where tP  is the daily market-adjusted share price and the constant -0.5/365 is an adjustment to 
recognise the flow of information is reflected in returns over the day;20 day 0 is 14 days after 
the announcement date .  
We compare ‘timeliness’ across firms; i.e. how quickly the firm reaches the terminal price on 
day 0. Assume a firm releases some value relevant information before the close of trading on 
day t = -364 and its share price moves to P-364. Now assume no more firm-specific value 
relevant information is released in the next 364 days and that the firm’s share price tracks the 
market index until the end of day t = 0. Under these extreme assumptions the speed of 
adjustment that year is at its maximum level possible and the timeliness metric is near zero 
(i.e. smaller values of timeliness indicate more timely price discovery). The timeliness 
measure, T, focuses solely on pricing outcomes and pays no attention to the method by which 
price discovery actually occurs. We also employ a deflated measure of timeliness, ‘Tdef’, 
which BB06 used to adjust for the magnitude of the drift in price. This measure is calculated 
by deflating the raw timeliness metric in Eq. (2) by one plus the absolute return over the 
period for which timeliness is calculated.  
The dependent variables described so far have limitations. For example, the document count 
measure does not consider when the documents were released, and the timeliness of prices 
                                                            
19 Following Beekes and Brown (2006, 2007) we measure the speed with which information is reflected in share 
price up to the time of the annual earnings announcement. This is an important event and is common to all firms 
in all countries. During the year leading up to the annual earnings announcement, the market becomes 
progressively better informed, so much so that, as Ball and Brown (1968) – who pioneered this literature – 
show, the share price of a US listed company reflects most of the information relating to annual earnings long 
before its announcement to the market.  
20 If daily log returns were i.i.d. (independently and identically distributed), timeliness (T) would have an 




measures are biased due to share price volatility. To address these limitations we build upon 
Beekes and Brown (2007) and include measures that reflect the timeliness of document 
disclosures and the timeliness of prices in good and bad times.  
We measure the timeliness of documents (Tdocs) as follows. The number of documents 
released each day is cumulated in a daily time series (ܥܦ௧) and the timeliness metric is 
calculated as in Eq. (3). Smaller values are associated with earlier (more timely) 
announcements to the share market.  
ܶ݀݋ܿݏ ൌ ሺሺ∑ ሺܥܦ଴ െ ܥܦ௧ሻ/ܥܦ଴ሻ െ 0.5ሻ/365௧ୀିଵ௧ୀିଷ଺ହ    (3) 
To measure the timeliness of good news documents, we decide whether any news was ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ based on the share’s price change over the announcement period. First, we forward-
fill any missing prices (if today’s price is missing, bring forward yesterday’s). Second, we 
identify the announcement period for today’s documents; we assume it comprises today and 
tomorrow (to accommodate post-market-closing announcements), or today only if there is 
another announcement tomorrow. Good news documents are processed as a separate time 
series (as in Eq. 3). The same procedure is followed for bad news documents. Documents 
associated with no price change are discarded. 
To measure the timeliness of good news in prices (Tgood), we first identify the third quartile 
of the absolute value of the share’s raw (unadjusted) daily log returns, ݎ௧,	 observed within the 
timeliness “window”; call the third quartile value ܳଷ. We then create a market-adjusted daily 
log return series, (r௧∗, ݐ ൌ ݏ, … , 0ሻ, where ݏ is the starting day of the series (when timeliness is 
calculated from returns, ݏ ൌ െ364	for the annual timeliness measure and ends on day ݐ ൌ 0, 
as described earlier). Next we construct a time series of cumulative good news returns, ܥ௧ீ ,	by 




from day -364 to day 0, where r௧ீ ൌ r௧∗ if |ݎ௧| ൐ ܳଷ; otherwise r௧ீ ൌ 0. The timeliness of good 
news in prices (Tgood) is then calculated as in Eq. (4), which corresponds to Eq. (2) and Eq. 
(3):  
ܶ݃݋݋݀ ൌ ሺሺ∑ ሺܥ଴ீ െ ܥ௧ீ ሻ/ܥ଴ீ ሻ െ 0.5ሻ/365௧ୀିଵ௧ୀିଷ଺ହ     (4) 
The absolute value of the raw (unadjusted) return is used to filter the daily returns in order to 
mitigate undue noise due to bid-ask bounce and to allow for the fact that more than 2 in 7 
prices are forward-filled (because calendar time includes non-trading days such as weekends 
and public holidays.) We chose the third quartile as the filter based on inspection of the 
empirical distributions of log returns for an ad hoc sample of about 100 firm-years. The 
equivalent procedure is adopted for bad news (Tbad). The all news measure (Tall) is the 
weighted sum of the good and bad news measures, where the weights sum to one and are 
ሺܥ଴ீ /ሾܥ଴ீ ൅ ܥ଴஻ሿሻ	and ሺܥ଴஻/ሾܥ଴ீ ൅ ܥ଴஻ሿሻ respectively and ܥ௧ீ  and ܥ௧஻ are the unsigned good and 
bad news cumulative values at the end of day 0. 
4.3 Explanatory Variables 
The additional firm-level variables in Eq. (1) control for other firm-specific factors that can 
affect a firm’s disclosures and timeliness. Closeown controls for the influence of close 
ownership on disclosure which could provide less incentive for disclosure (Andersen and 
Reeb, 2003; Chen et al., 2008). Good News controls for the positive association observed 
between disclosure and firm performance (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Lev and Penman, 
1990). Firm size controls for the positive association observed between disclosure and size 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Leverage is included as more highly levered firms are more 
risky and therefore may be under greater scrutiny (Taylor et al., 2012), and may be prompted 




for the expectation that greater volatility in performance could result in additional disclosures 
due to investors’ greater demand for information. Cross-listing on a US exchange via level II 
or level III American Depository Receipts (ADRs) requires additional disclosures to meet the 
greater reporting requirements of US exchanges (Durand and Tarca, 2005) and prior research 
has shown cross-listed firms are associated with a better information environment (Lang et 
al., 2003). Models also control for industry sector as some firms may have less incentive to 
disclose due to their greater proprietary costs (Core, 2001; Verrecchia, 1983), especially in 
sectors with large research and development expenditures such as health care or information 
technology.  
We include a number of country-level variables to capture potentially significant differences 
across sample countries. First, we control for the level of information dissemination, which is 
proxied by the log of the number of internet users per 100 people (Internet), and the level of 
stock market development which could influence the timeliness of prices and level of 
disclosure. Following Doidge et al. (2007) and Yu (2011), we use the ratio of stock market 
capitalisation to Gross Domestic Product [GDP] (Stkmkcap) to proxy for stock market 
development. Higher values of Stkmkcap are associated with greater stock market 
development. We also include a variable capturing the amount of state involvement in a 
particular country’s enterprises and the overall level of state investment (Gwartney, et al., 
2010). Govei measures the extent to which countries rely on governments and political 
processes to make decisions, rather than individuals and markets, and is coded such that 
higher values are associated with greater independence from government. The level of a 
country’s economic development could also affect disclosure and timeliness and we include 




The overall quality of financial reporting and audit in a country may influence firm 
disclosures and transparency. To incorporate this we include the audit and enforcement 
indices of Brown et al. (2014). Audit measures the “quality of the public company auditors’ 
working environment” and Enforce measures the “degree of accounting enforcement activity 
by independent enforcement bodies” Brown et al. (2014, p.1). Higher values of these indices 
are associated with better audit quality and more effective enforcement practices. 
Country culture is likely to affect perceived costs of disclosure, with societies which have a 
preference to avoid uncertainty focusing on potential costs more than the benefits of 
disclosure. We use Hofstede’s construct Uncertainty avoidance (UAI), which refers to the 
“extent to which people feel uncomfortable with ambiguity or unknown situations”, to 
represent country culture (as in Hope, 2003; Hooghiemstra et al., 2015). Higher values of 
UAI are associated with a preference for avoiding uncertainty. We also include Hofstede’s 
Individualism (IDV) construct, as in Hooghiemstra et al. (2015). Individualism measures the 
extent to which people are focussed on individual versus collective interests, with higher 
values being associated with more individualistic cultures. More individualistic cultures are 
likely to be associated with greater disclosures and timeliness as managers build a reputation 
for credible and ‘full’ disclosure.  
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
XX TABLE 2 XX 
Table 2, panel A presents descriptive statistics for the documents sample (N=7,541). Firms in 
our sample release on average 79 documents per year which equates to roughly one and a half 
documents per week, although the standard deviation (108) indicates some firms release 




timely outcomes and greater transparency. The firm level timeliness of documents (Tdocs) 
ranges from 0.10 to 0.99 with an average of 0.52. On average firms meet 48 per cent of the 
CG characteristics. Just under half the observations relate to years when firm performance 
was above the market level (Good News). Analysis by country (not tabulated) shows that 
Australia has the greatest number of firm documents per year on average. Japan has the 
lowest overall CG rating (CG mean = 0.33) perhaps due to the existence of large boards of 
directors and a lack of independent board membership (Uchida, 2011),21 whereas Canada has 
the highest (CG mean = 0.68). Just over half the sample observations (ܰ ൌ 4,094) are from 
countries with a common law legal origin. Tests of the difference in means for documents 
and the timeliness of documents (not tabulated) show significantly greater document 
disclosure levels and more timely disclosures in common law countries (p < 0.001). In 
addition, CG is ‘better’ on average for firms in common law countries (mean CG: 0.56 vs 
0.37; p < 0.001).  
Table 2 panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the prices sample (ܰ ൌ 26,126). 
Timeliness, T, (Timeliness Deflated, Tdef) for the overall sample ranges between 0.03 (0.03) 
and 0.97 (0.43) with a mean of 0.19 (0.13), after winsorising at the top and bottom 1 per cent. 
The timeliness of good (Tgood), bad (Tbad) and all (Tall) news have similar distributions 
with means of 0.52 for the full sample. Again, the average firm meets about half the 24 
governance characteristics measured by CG. Analysis by country (not tabulated) shows 
Norway has the least timely price discovery (T mean = 0.22) as measured by the raw 
timeliness metric. Belgium has the lowest overall CG on average with only 31 per cent of ISS 
governance criteria being satisfied (CG mean = 0.31), whereas Canada has the highest (CG 
mean = 0.68). In the prices sample, 75 per cent of observations (ܰ ൌ 19,642) relate to 
                                                            
21 In the documents sample less than 1 per cent of Japanese firms meet the criterion for board independence, 
(item 2) although 81 per cent meet the criterion for board size (item 7) (details not tabulated). This compares 




countries of common law legal origin. A test for the difference of means (not tabulated) 
shows CG quality is statistically higher in common law countries (0.58 vs. 0.37; p < 0.001).  
XX TABLE 3 XX 
Variable correlations for the documents sample are shown in Table 3, panel A. CG is 
positively correlated with the log of the number of documents released (Ldocs) (ݎ ൌ 0.43) 
and negatively correlated with all measures of the timeliness of documents (Tdocs, Tdocs 
Good, Tdocs Bad). This suggests firms with better CG are associated with greater disclosure 
and their documents are released in a timelier fashion. Also larger firms are positively 
associated with document disclosure (Ldocs) (ݎ ൌ 0.21), but interestingly we find no 
evidence of a significant relationship between CG and Size. Common law countries are found 
to be associated with a greater number of disclosure documents (Ldocs) and they tend to be 
timelier (Tdocs). There is also a positive correlation (ݎ ൌ 0.67) between CG and Common, 
suggesting better overall individual firm level CG in common law countries. 
Table 3, panel B shows the variable correlations for the prices sample. Correlations between 
all measures of timeliness and CG are positive (i.e. the correlations indicate better CG 
accompanies less timely price discovery). Larger firms have more timely price discovery as 
indicated by the negative correlation between firm size (Size) and Timeliness. Close 
ownership (Closeheld) is negatively associated with CG (ݎ	 ൌ 	െ0.30), indicating 
substitution effects may be at work between ownership structures and other CG mechanisms. 
Being a firm in a common law country is positively associated with all measures of 
timeliness, implying longer term price discovery is less timely (i.e. slower) for firms in 
common law countries. However, the correlations are relatively low, ranging from 0.05 to 
0.16 over the five measures. 




XX TABLE 4 XX 
Table 4 shows the results for four models estimating the relationship, for all countries 
combined, between CG and (1) the number of disclosures (documents), (2) the timeliness of 
those disclosures, and (3, 4) the timeliness of prices. The models are estimated by pooled 
OLS methods with standard errors clustered by firm. All models include fixed effects for year 
and GICS sector. All coefficients relate to variables that have been standardized to assist 
interpretation.22 In the interests of brevity we do not tabulate the results for the raw timeliness 
metric (T); the results for T are comparable to those reported below for timeliness deflated, 
Tdef.  
Column 1 shows the results for the quantity of disclosure (Ldocs). We find a complementary 
relation between CG and disclosure in code law countries, as reflected in a positive and 
significant coefficient on CG. Common law countries are associated with greater disclosure 
as seen in the positive and significant coefficient on Common. The coefficient on 
Common·CG is not statistically significant, which suggests CG has comparable effects on 
disclosure across firms irrespective of the level of investor protection and is inconsistent with 
hypothesis 1. However the interaction Common·Closeheld is negative and significant 
suggesting close ownership is associated with greater secrecy and fewer disclosures in 
common law countries, consistent with Andersen and Reeb (2003) and Chen et al. (2008). 
                                                            
22 The standardization procedure, which is applied to the explanatory variables only, is as follows. Continuous 
variables are transformed by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation; indicator variables are 
transformed by subtracting the mean. For interacted terms, we subtract the mean of the variable created by the 
interaction of the indicator variable and the standardized continuous variable. The transformations are based on 
the means and standard deviations of the sub-sample of cases used to fit the particular model. The mean-
centring of right hand side variables causes the constant term to be the mean of the dependent variable, so that 
marginal effects (as reflected in the size of the coefficients) are readily interpreted relative to the average value 
of the dependent variable. The advantage of this process is that it removes the arbitrary scale of the continuous 






The implication is that even with strong investor protection, close ownership can mean fewer 
disclosures, which could detrimentally affect minority shareholders. 
The results for the Timeliness of Documents and the Timeliness of Prices are shown in 
columns 2 to 4. Recall a negative coefficient indicates more timely disclosures. First, we 
consider the timeliness of documents. In code law countries, the relation between CG and the 
timeliness of documents (Tdocs) is complementary (i.e. better-governed firms release 
documents on a more timely basis), as reflected in a negative and significant coefficient on 
CG (column 2). Close ownership in code law countries is also associated with more timely 
disclosures. Common law countries are less timely in disclosures relative to code law 
countries. However CG has a larger effect on the timeliness of disclosures in common law 
than in code law countries. This confirms hypothesis 2, that better CG is associated with 
more timely document disclosures in common law countries. 
Next we turn to the timeliness with which value-relevant information is priced.23 Column 3 
shows the results for Timeliness Deflated (Tdef). We find the relation between CG and 
timeliness of prices is positive in code law countries (i.e. firms substitute between CG quality 
and timeliness). Firms in common law countries are associated with more timely price 
discovery, as reflected in a negative and significant coefficient on Common. This is not 
unexpected given the greater likelihood of litigation and enforcement of laws in common law 
countries. The interaction Common·CG is insignificant implying there is no difference in the 
effect of CG between code and common law countries; i.e. CG and the timeliness of prices 
are substitutes for firms in both groups of countries, inconsistent with hypothesis 3. A 
possible explanation for the inconsistency is that market participants have more information 
available about the performance of better-governed firms which takes longer to process and 
                                                            
23 The results reported for the timeliness of prices (Tdef and Tall) in Table 4 do not control for cross-listing in 




be reflected in prices. We examine this issue further in robustness testing (section 6.1). For 
the timeliness of all news in prices, Tall (column 4), which specifically controls for volatility, 
results are comparable to our previous results for Tdef. We find better-governed firms in both 
code and common law countries have less timely price discovery. However, according to the 
Tall measure, firms that are more closely held are associated with more timely price 
discovery.  
The estimated influence of the control variables is largely as expected: larger firms, more 
highly levered firms, and firms with more volatile performance release more documents. 
Larger firms are associated with more timely disclosures and prices. Also cross-listed firms 
with better CG appear to be quicker in getting documents to the market. Country 
characteristics also influence disclosures: more individualistic cultures are associated with 
fewer disclosures, while countries with greater enforcement and less government intervention 
release more documents. Firms domiciled in countries with a stronger cultural preference for 
avoiding uncertainty are less timely when releasing documents. We also find a positive 
association between economic development, as measured by per capita GDP, and the 
timeliness of documents and prices. 
 
XX TABLE 5 XX 
CG Codes and stock market regulators are particularly concerned about the balance between 
good and bad news disclosures (see for example, Australian Stock Exchange Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003; Toronto Stock Exchange, 2004). In table 5 we examine the 
timeliness results according to whether the firm apparently had good or bad news for the 
market. In columns 1 and 2 we analyse the timeliness of good or bad news for documents. 




more timely disclosures in code law countries. However for bad news documents, we find 
CG has a larger effect in common law than in code law countries, as reflected in the negative 
and significant coefficient (-0.012) on Common·CG. This indicates a bias towards bad news 
document timeliness for better-governed firms in common law countries, perhaps due to a 
greater fear of costly litigation. This result for bad news documents is consistent with 
hypothesis 2. In order to assess the importance of disclosures made to the market, we weight 
each day on which at least one document was released by the return on that day24 and 
construct return-weighted measures of Tdocs Good and Tdocs Bad. Our results (not 
tabulated) show firms in common law countries are more timely in releasing their disclosures 
irrespective of whether it is for good or bad news, but better governed firms in common law 
countries are incrementally more timely for bad, but not good news documents. 
Examining the timeliness of prices for good and bad news (columns 3 and 4), we find CG has 
a positive association with both types of news timeliness (i.e. a substitution relation) in code 
law countries. Close ownership in code law countries is associated with more timely price 
discovery when there is good news. Also, in common law countries there is more timely price 
discovery for good, but not bad news. We find insignificant coefficients on the interaction 
term, Common·CG, and also conclude there is no incremental effect of CG in common law 
countries relative to code law countries. This means comparable effects of CG exist in code 
and common law countries, i.e. CG also has a substitution relation in common law countries 
for good and bad news timeliness.  
                                                            
24 To implement this procedure, all document release dates that are non-trading days are “bumped forward” to 
the first trading day after that release date. Then, to allow for the possibility a given release was made after the 
last sale for the day, we use the size of the market-adjusted log return from the close of the previous trading day 
until the close of the trading day after the release date as the weight, unless a further disclosure was also made 
on the day after. In the latter case, we use the closing price on the (possibly “bumped”) release date, in order to 




In summary, our results show there is a complementary relationship between CG and 
disclosure frequency for all countries. Results also indicate that the individual firm’s CG is 
important in common law countries in determining the timeliness of releases to the market, 
particularly for bad news documents, consistent with hypothesis 2. However, results for the 
timeliness of price discovery are contradictory: CG appears to substitute for the timeliness of 
price discovery in both code and common law countries, inconsistent with hypothesis 3. 
These results are however consistent with Ferreira et al. (2011), who find evidence of a 
substitution relationship between board independence and stock price informativeness. A 
reason for this result may be that insider trading laws are stricter and enforced more strongly 
in common law countries, which results in less insider trading (Beny, 2005; Bhattacharya and 
Daouk, 2002). As a consequence, value-relevant information is slower in coming to the 
market over the year leading up to the annual earnings announcement.  
6. Robustness 
We subjected our main results to a number of robustness tests (results not tabulated): (i) 
excluding cross-listed firms (and USA firms from the prices sample) as they may have 
differing incentives for disclosure than other firms given the additional requirements of USA 
exchanges and regulators; (ii) using the natural log of total assets (in USD) for Size; (iii) 
excluding observations from the financials and utilities sectors due to differing regulations on 
these sectors;25 (iv) controlling for growth opportunities using the book to market ratio, as 
firms with more growth opportunities may have less incentive for disclosure due to 
proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983); (v) restricting our results to cases where we have 
documents and prices data, resulting in exclusion of Austria, France, New Zealand, 
Switzerland and USA and a smaller sample (ܰ ൌ 7,451); (vi) using alternative measures of 
                                                            
25 There are 1,604 observations in the documents sample and 5,769 observations in the prices sample which 




ownership from OSIRIS in place of Closeheld;26 (vii) substituting an alternative measure of 
CG known as Gov7 for CG, as used by Aggarwal et al. (2009) and Yu (2011);27 (viii) 
excluding 2008 due to the global financial crisis,28 and (ix) using above the sample median 
level of the anti-self-dealing and anti-director indices (Djankov et al., 2008) as alternative 
measures to capture investor protection, in place of Common.29  
In addition to the above, we conducted the following tests for the documents model (Ldocs). 
First, we used Poisson estimation methods to allow for count dependent variables. Second, 
we included a control for last year’s reporting lag, defined as the number of days from the 
financial year end date to the annual earnings release date. Third, we used four alternative 
measures of documents to control for the effect of mandated country-specific disclosures and 
industry-specific disclosures.30 For the timeliness of prices models we excluded the USA 
                                                            
26 We identify the percentage of block institutional shareholding (Instown) and family ownership (Family), 
which reduces our sample size to ܰ	 ൌ 	4,759 for the documents and ܰ ൌ 17,615 for the prices samples 
respectively. Descriptive statistics for the new ownership variables (not tabulated) are for the documents (prices) 
sample respectively: Family, mean = 3 (5.39), S.D. = 9.48 (12.79); Instown, mean = 16 (9.86), S.D. = 19.46 
(15.51). Results show family ownership is associated with more disclosures in code law countries, but fewer 
disclosures in common law countries. For block institutional ownership, we find fewer disclosures in code law 
countries, but incrementally more disclosures in common law countries. Family and institutional ownership has 
no significant effect on the timeliness of documents or prices. Results also show better CG in common law 
countries is associated with more timely price discovery, although we cannot rule out that this is due to the 
decrease in observations for this sample. 
27  This measure of CG includes two new CG factors not included in CG (see Appendix Table A:2). The 
correlation between CG and Gov7 is ݎ ൌ 0.86 for the documents sample and ݎ ൌ 0.77 for the prices sample. 
Results (not tabulated) suggest that better-governed firms in common law countries make incrementally fewer 
disclosures than better-governed firms in code law countries. They are also found to have incrementally slower 
release of good news, but comparable timeliness for bad news documents. We argue our measure of CG is more 
focussed on transparency aspects and therefore provides a more appropriate measure to assess firm’s CG, which 
could explain the somewhat differing results for the documents models. 
28  Our results show better-governed firms in common law countries are associated with significantly fewer 
disclosures relative to better-governed firms in code law countries, but overall the coefficient is still positive 
(0.161+[-0.085] = 0.076). Also CG is no longer a significant variable in the Tbad model, suggesting no impact 
of CG on the timeliness of bad news in prices. 
29 The correlation between Common and High-Anti Director (High Anti-Self) indices is ݎ	 ൌ 	0.59 (0.65). Our 
results are sensitive to the use of the anti-self-dealing index: for firms in countries with a low score on the anti-
self-dealing index (below the median) we find CG is associated with more timely good news disclosure, but 
there is no association with the timeliness of bad news documents or the overall level of disclosure. Firms with 
better CG in countries with a high score on the anti-self-dealing index (above the median) are associated with 
greater disclosure, and more timely disclosures and price discovery. 
30 Specifically, we use the following four alternative measures for documents: (1) the number of documents less 
the minimum number of documents for the country across our entire sample period; (2) the number of 




(ܰ	 ൌ 	15,179) from the sample, enabling us to control for firms in other countries that cross-
list in the USA, and an interaction term between cross-listing and CG.31 The results are 
broadly consistent across all of the different specifications, except where identified. This 
suggests our results are relatively robust and not driven by any specific details of how we 
have performed the analysis.  
 
6.1 Further Results 
To investigate our results for the timeliness of prices further, we used the sample for which 
we have prices and document data (ܰ ൌ 7,451). Acknowledging that there can be differing 
incentives to disclose by country and also by industry, we sorted our sample by country and 
industry, and split the sample into quartiles based upon the level of documents disclosed. We 
took observations in the 75th percentile or greater to represent ‘High’ disclosure and those in 
the 25th percentile or lower to represent ‘Low’ disclosure. We then re-estimated the 
timeliness of prices models (Tdef, Tall, Tgood and Tbad) for both partitions. Results (not 
tabulated) for firms with low disclosure (ܰ ൌ 1,944) show firms with better CG in code law 
countries have less timely price discovery. However, better-governed firms in common law 
countries are significantly more timely relative to better-governed firms in code law 
countries. A comparison of the results for the timeliness of good and bad news revealed the 
increase in timeliness relates primarily to bad, rather than good news.  
For firms with high disclosure (ܰ ൌ 1,887), we find those with better CG are less timely in 
code law countries. For the Tdef model, we find a weak negative association with timeliness 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
documents less the minimum number of documents for the industry across our entire sample; and (4) the 
number of documents less the minimum number of documents for the industry in that particular year.  
31  We find cross-listing in the USA is associated with less timely price discovery. Cross-listed firms with 
weaker CG have an increased timeliness of bad news in prices, but no comparable effect for the timeliness of 
good news in prices. Cross-listed firms with better CG appear less timely for good news but have comparable 




for better-governed firms in common law countries. However, the improved measures of 
timeliness, Tall, Tgood and Tbad, show no significant difference in timeliness between better 
governed firms in common and code law countries, suggesting a substitution relationship 
between CG and timeliness regardless of legal origin. From this we infer CG has a noticeably 
larger effect on timeliness of prices for firms with lower levels of disclosure, which may 
indicate limits on investors’ capacity to process information. 
 
7. Endogeneity 
We considered the potential influence of endogeneity in CG and ownership on our documents 
and prices results, and explored at some length the use of instrumental variables (IV) 
estimation. Use of IV requires the selection of instruments that are both highly correlated 
with the variable for which they are instruments while at the same time being uncorrelated 
with the error (Kennedy, 2003, p.159; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007; Brown et al., 2011). The 
instruments investigated are as follows: the average industrial sector level of CG, the average 
year level of CG (the current firm is excluded from the calculation of both instruments), and 
interactions of these variables with legal origin (Common). We used the Hansen J-test to 
check the validity of instruments used in our estimations, where a rejection of the null 
hypothesis casts doubt on validity. The Hansen test indicated these instruments are not robust 
and may yield unreliable IV results. It would seem likely that IV estimates would be 
inappropriate in this case: as Larcker and Rusticus (2010; 187) argue “it is likely that IV 
estimates are more biased and more likely to provide the wrong statistical inference than 
simple OLS estimates that make no correction for endogeneity.” For this reason we rely 






We examine whether disclosure and timeliness are jointly affected by the investor protection 
regime in which the firm is domiciled and the firm’s CG. We use a multi-country sample of 
firms over the period 2003 to 2008 to investigate the relation between the firm’s CG and its 
disclosures, and the timeliness of price discovery. We proxy the investor protection and 
litigation environment by the legal origin of countries, where common law countries are 
associated with greater investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998). 
The results suggest better CG in code and common law countries is associated with a greater 
number of disclosures to the stock market (i.e. a complementary relationship between CG and 
firm disclosure). This is consistent with prior research for Australia (Beekes and Brown 
(2006), Canada (Beekes et al., 2012) and Japan (Aman et al., 2011). Our results also indicate 
better-governed firms on the whole release their documents to the stock market in a more 
timely manner. To be more specific, where there is better investor protection, firms with 
better CG are more timely when releasing documents relating to bad news items, 
demonstrating a conservative bias which is consistent with arguments made by Skinner 
(1994). 
In relation to equity market transparency, we find better CG is associated with less, not more, 
timely price discovery in code or common law countries. The implication is that firms with 
better CG substitute governance processes for greater transparency, or alternatively that 
market participants take longer to digest the greater amount of information disclosed by 
better-governed firms. Prior single-country studies found the opposite for Australia (BB06) 
and Canada (Beekes et al., 2012), although results for Japan (Aman et al., 2011) are 
consistent with ours. Additional analysis suggests CG is effective at increasing the timeliness 




relative to the industry and country norm. This perhaps points to the notion of a “preferred” 
level of disclosure which market participants are able to process more effectively.  
Our analysis includes the influence of share ownership. Firms in common law countries with 
a greater proportion of closely held shares make fewer disclosures, which is consistent with 
the view that firms controlled by insiders are less willing to release information to outside 
parties. We do find some evidence, in both documents and stock prices, that closely held 
shares are associated with more timely release of good news. 
We contribute to a growing literature on CG and show it can have a positive influence on the 
amount of information available about a firm, but some results relating to the association 
between CG and the timeliness of price discovery may be worthy of further investigation. 
Work we have in progress examines the effect of CG and ownership on the activities of 
information intermediaries, including analyst following and the properties of analysts’ 
forecasts. Although the present study shows better-governed firms release more information, 
a question remains unaddressed: is this information processed effectively by analysts, and if 
so, how is it reflected in attributes of their forecasts? The answer to this question may, 
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions and Sources of data 
Variable Acronym Description of Variable. Sources of data provided in parentheses 
Measures of Disclosure and Transparency:  
Release date Release Date Date of the firm’s release (announcement) of its annual earnings. The release date is defined as the earliest 
date, more than 15 days and less than 180 days after the balance sheet date, reported by any one of 
Bloomberg, Compustat, Compustat Global, I/B/E/S, Reuters and Worldscope.  
Document Count Docs Number of documents released by the firm measured on an annual basis ending on the Release Date. The 
number of documents are as reported by the Australian Stock Exchange for Australia, NYSE Euronext for 
Belgium, France, Netherlands and Portugal, SEDAR for Canada, Nasdaq OMX for Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden, Athens Exchange for Greece, Hong Kong Exchange for Hong Kong, Irish Stock Exchange for 
Ireland, Borsa Italia for Italy, Timely Disclosure Network of Tokyo Stock Exchange for Japan, OSLO 
Bors for Norway, Singapore Exchange for Singapore, Comison Nacional Del Mercado de Valores for 
Spain, Perfect Information for UK. 
Log of Document Count Ldocs Natural log of Docs.  
Timeliness of documents Tdocs The timeliness of documents. 
Timeliness of good news 
documents 
Tdocs Good The timeliness of good news documents. 
Timeliness of bad news 
documents 
Tdocs Bad The timeliness of bad news documents. 
Timeliness of price discovery T The timeliness metric, measured as the average daily absolute difference between the log of the market-
adjusted share price that day and the log of market-adjusted share price 14 trading days after the Release 
Date. (Daily stock and market index returns are sourced from CRSP and Datastream.) 
Timeliness deflated Tdef The timeliness metric divided by one plus the absolute market-adjusted rate of return on the share over the 
365 day period used to calculate the share’s timeliness metric. 
Timeliness of good news Tgood The timeliness of good news, based on daily market-adjusted returns >0. 
Timeliness of bad news Tbad The timeliness of bad news, based on daily market-adjusted returns <0. 
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Timeliness of all news Tall The timeliness of all news, based on the absolute value of daily market-adjusted returns. 
Measure of Corporate Governance and Ownership: 
Corporate Governance CG Aggregate measure of CG based upon meeting 24 indicators of CG “Quality” as in Chung et al. (2010) 
[see Table A:2 for details]. The measure sums the number of criteria a firm meets and divides the total by 
24. CG ranges between 0 and 1 where 1 represents best governance (Institutional Shareholder Services). 
Corporate Governance  Gov7 Aggregate Measure of CG based upon meeting 7 indicators of CG “Quality” as in Aggarwal et al. (2009) 
and Yu (2011) [see Table A:2 for details]. The measure sums the number of criteria a firm meets and 
divides the total by 7. CG ranges between 0 and 1 where 1 represents best governance (Institutional 
Shareholder Services). 
Closely Held Shares Closeheld Measure of ownership concentration based on the fraction of shares which are closely held [Worldscope 
Item: WS.CloselyHeldSharesPct] (Worldscope). 
Firm-Level Variables: 
Firm Size Size Natural log of the firm’s market value of equity at balance sheet date in USD. (CRSP, Worldscope) 
Leverage Lev Leverage at the balance sheet date defined as Total Debtt/Total Assetst [Compustat items: lt/at and 
Worldscope items: WS.TotalDebt/WS.TotalAssets]. (Compustat, Worldscope). 
Volatility Volatility Volatility calculated from daily log return in the 90 days ending the day before we observe the first price 
for the timeliness metric. (CRSP, Datastream). 
Good News Good News Dummy variable, representing favourable news about individual performance relative to the market 
performance, equal to one if the market-adjusted return over the 365 days ended 14 calendar days after the 
release date is positive, and zero otherwise. For each country we use the appropriate country-specific 
market index as the benchmark level of performance. (CRSP, Worldscope). 
Cross-Listing Crosslist Dummy variable, representing cross-listing on a US exchange for firms not domiciled in USA. This 
variable has a value of one if the firm is cross-listed on a USA stock exchange using a level II or level III 
American Depository Receipt; and zero otherwise. (Bank of New York; US stock exchanges, Securities 
and Exchange Commission). 





Legal Origin Common A dummy variable coded 1 for countries with a common law legal origin, and 0 otherwise. (La Porta et 
al. 1998). 
Government involvement Govei This variable is based upon underlying data on the “number, composition and share of output supplied by 
state enterprises and the overall level of government investment” (p.219). It measures “the extent to 
which a country relies on personal choice and markets, rather than government budgets and political 
decision-marking” (p.3). Ratings range from 0 to 10 where a higher rating is associated with less 
government involvement. (Gwartney et al., 2010). 
Individualism IDV The Individualism index measures the extent to which individuals have a “preference for a loosely-knit 
social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate 
families” versus collectivism which “represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in 
which individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular in-group to look after them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty,” (Hofstede, 2015). Individualism ranges from 0 (collectivism) to 100 
(very individualistic). 
Uncertainty Avoidance index UAI The Uncertainty Avoidance index measures “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened 
by ambiguous or unknown situations and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these”. A 
higher score is associated with a greater preference for avoiding uncertainty. (Hofstede, 2015) 
Uncertainty avoidance ranges from 0 (no fear of uncertainty) to 100 (very concerned about uncertainty).  
Information Dissemination Internet Natural log of the number of internet users per 100 people (World Development Indicators, The World 
Bank, 2010). 
Stock Market Development Stmkcap Stock market capitalization / GDP (Financial Structure Database, The World Bank, 2010). 
Audit index Audit Audit index which measures the “quality of public company auditors’ working environment” where 
higher values are associated with better quality (Brown et al., 2014, p.1). 
Enforcement index Enforce Enforcement index measures the “degree of accounting enforcement activity by independent enforcement 
bodies” where higher values are associated with greater enforcement (Brown et al., 2014, p.1). 
Gross Domestic Product GDPPC 
 
A proxy for country size. Natural log of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in 
current USD as at 2010 (World Development Indicators, the World Bank, 2010).  
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Table A.2: Governance Categories and Mean Values for Individual Firm Level Corporate Governance 
PANEL A: Measure of Corporate Governance as Chung et al. (2010) 
Data Sample 
Item 





1 AUDIT Audit committee consists solely of independent outside directors. 0.43 0.69 
2 BOARD Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors. 0.34 0.68 
3 BOARD Nominating committee is comprised solely of independent outside directors. 0.20 0.49 
4 BOARD Compensation committee is comprised solely of independent outside directors. 0.37 0.62 
5 BOARD Governance committee meets at least once during the year. 0.16 0.43 
6 BOARD Board members are elected annually. 0.40 0.41 
7 BOARD Size of board of directors is at least six but not more than 15 members. 0.87 0.88 
8 BOARD Shareholders have cumulative voting rights to elect directors. 0.01 0.06 
9 BOARD CEO serves on no more than two additional boards of other public companies. 0.86 0.91 
10 BOARD No former CEO serves on board. 0.76 0.81 
11 BOARD The CEO and chairman duties are separated or a lead director is specified. 0.67 0.61 
12 BOARD Board guidelines are disclosed publicly. 0.63 0.55 
13 CHARTER Company has no poison pill. 1.00 0.82 
14 CHARTER A majority vote is required to amend charter/bylaws (not supermajority). 0.02 0.28 
15 CHARTER A simple majority vote is required to approve a merger (not supermajority). 0.12 0.43 
16 CHARTER Shareholders may act by written consent, and the consent is not unanimous. 0.08 0.17 
17 CHARTER Shareholders are allowed to call special meetings. 0.99 0.67 
18 CHARTER Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholders’ approval or only in limited circumstances. 1.00 0.44 
19 CHARTER Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred stock. 0.94 0.49 
20 COMPENSATION Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock. 0.23 0.61 
21 OWNERSHIP All directors with more than one year of service own stock. 0.59 0.77 
22 OWNERSHIP Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines. 0.22 0.43 
23 OWNERSHIP Directors are subject to stock ownership guidelines. 0.13 0.20 
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24 STATE Incorporation in a state without any takeover provisions. 0.41 0.20 
OVERALL  Overall Index of Corporate Governance. 0.48 0.53 
 
PANEL B: Measure of Corporate Governance as Aggarwal et al. (2009), Yu (2011) known as Gov7 
Data Sample 
Item 





1 BOARD Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors. 0.34 0.68 
2 BOARD Size of board of directors is at least six but not more than 15 members. 0.87 0.88 
3 BOARD The CEO and chairman duties are separated or a lead director is specified. 0.67 0.61 
4 BOARD Board members are elected annually. 0.40 0.41 
5 AUDIT Audit committee consists solely of independent outside directors. 0.43 0.69 
6* AUDIT Auditors ratified at most recent annual meeting 0.64 0.68 
7* STOCK CLASS Only one class of common stock (not dual class) 0.94 0.94 
 OVERALL Measure of CG: Gov7 0.61 0.70 
Note: Panel A of this table shows the mean values for the twenty-four CG standards relating to financial and operating transparency included in our measure of CG for the 
two data samples used in this study (N=7,541) for the documents and (N=26,126) for the prices samples respectively for firms with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 
December 2008. These CG standards are taken from data compiled by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and are the same 24 items used in the measure of CG in 
Chung, Elder, Kim (2010). Panel B shows the mean values for the seven CG standards included in the measure of CG as in Aggarwal et al. (2009), Yu (2011). Note: * 
indicates item is not included in the 24-aspect measure of CG shown in Panel A. Country coverage of the ISS Global and USA CG datasets is as follows: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. Sample coverage on the ISS dataset for South Korea is minimal (limited to 2007 and 2008), and for this reason we decided to 
exclude South Korea from our sample. The documents sample excludes Austria, Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland and USA due to unavailability of document data.  
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Table 1: Country Coverage  
Country 
No of obs in 
documents 
analysis 




AUSTRALIA 482 556 Common 
AUSTRIA 0 109 Code 
BELGIUM 77 134 Code 
CANADA 750 762 Common 
DENMARK 118 124 Code 
FINLAND 167 168 Code 
FRANCE 190 468 Code 
GERMANY 0 432 Code 
GREECE 56 99 Code 
HONG KONG 492 513 Common 
IRELAND 81 89 Common 
ITALY 131 364 Code 
JAPAN 2,018 3,323 Code 
NETHERLANDS 100 211 Code 
NEW ZEALAND 0 84 Common 
NORWAY 125 127 Code 
PORTUGAL 34 79 Code 
SINGAPORE 97 313 Common 
SPAIN 249 273 Code 
SWEDEN 182 270 Code 
SWITZERLAND 0 303 Code 
UK 2,192 2,146 Common 
USA 0 15,179 Common 
Total 7,541 26,126  
Note: The documents sample excludes Austria, Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland and USA due to 
unavailability of document data. The documents sample contains 7,541 firm-year observations for 2,078 unique 
firms. The prices sample contains 26,126 firm year observations for 5,859 unique firms. The sample period for 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Firm Level Variables 
Panel A: Documents Analysis (N = 7,541) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Docs 78.52 49 107.9 7 804 
Ldocs 3.95 3.89 0.84 1.95 6.69 
Tdocs 0.52 0.51 0.10 0.10 0.99 
Tdocs Good 0.52 0.51 0.14 0.06 1 
Tdocs Bad 0.52 0.51 0.14 0 1 
CG 0.48 0.46 0.14 0.17 0.88 
Closeheld 29.41 25.53 22.46 0 99.03 
Size 7.75 7.74 1.56 1.44 12.78 
Lev 0.23 0.22 0.18 0 0.74 
Volatility 1.65 1.46 0.83 0.09 14.28 
Good News = 1 48% 0 1 
Crosslist = 1 13% 0 1 
Panel B: Prices Analysis (N = 26,126) 
Variables Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Min Max 
T 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.97 
Tdef 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.43 
Tgood 0.52 0.52 0.08 0.08 0.93 
Tbad 0.52 0.51 0.09 0.10 0.90 
Tall 0.52 0.51 0.07 0.09 0.90 
CG 0.53 0.54 0.14 0.17 0.96 
Closeheld 26.92 21.94 22.33 0 100 
Size 6.89 6.97 1.95 -0.15 13.13 
Lev 0.41 0.37 0.28 0 1.07 
Volatility 1.96 1.68 1.15 0.09 22.47 
Good News =1 48%   0 1 
Crosslist = 1 12%   0 1 
Note: Docs is the annual number of documents released by the firm and Ldocs is the natural logarithm of Docs. 
Docs is winsorised at the top and bottom 1% to control for outliers. Tdocs is the timeliness of documents. Tdocs 
Good (Bad) is the timeliness of documents when there is good (bad) news. T is the timeliness metric, measured 
as the average daily absolute difference between the log of the market-adjusted share price that day and the log 
of market-adjusted share price 14 days after the release of the firm’s financial results for the year. Tdef is 
Timeliness deflated, measured as the timeliness metric divided by one plus the absolute rate of return on the 
share over the period used to calculate the share’s timeliness metric. Both T and Tdef are winsorised at the top 
and bottom 1% to control for outliers. Tgood is the timeliness of good news and Tbad is the timeliness of Bad 
News. Tgood and Tbad are additional measures of timeliness in times of good and bad news respectively where 
news is classified as good or bad dependent upon the return for that particular day; a share price return above the 
market return is classified as ‘good news’ and a return below the market return is classified as ‘bad news’. Tall 
is the timeliness of all news which is a measure of timeliness taking both good and bad news into account. CG is 
a measure of corporate governance between 0 and 1 where higher values are associated with ‘better’ corporate 
governance according to the ISS CG classification of 24 underlying CG aspects (see Appendix Table A:2 for 
details). Closeheld is the percentage of shares which are closely held at the year-end according to Worldscope. 
Size is measured as the natural log of year end market value in USD. Lev is year-end leverage defined as total 
48 
 
debt divided by total assets. Leverage has been winsorised at the top and bottom 1% to control for outliers. 
Volatility is calculated from daily log returns in the 90 days ending the day before we observe the first price for 
the timeliness metric. Values for Volatility have been multiplied by 100 in the above table to increase precision. 
Good News is a dummy variable with a value of one if the market-adjusted return over the 365 days ended 14 
days after the release date is positive, and is zero otherwise. Crosslist is a dummy variable with a value of one if 
the firm is cross-listed on a major US stock exchange, and is zero otherwise. For the prices sample Crosslist is 
based upon the sample excluding US firms (ܰ ൌ 10,947). For further details on variable measurement and data 
sources, see the Appendix Table A:1.   
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Table 3: Bivariate Relationships  
Panel A: Variables in the Documents Analysis (N = 7,541) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1. Docs     
2. Ldocs 0.79*    
3. Tdocs -0.02* -0.13*   
4. Tdocs Good -0.01 -0.08* 0.66*   
5. Tdocs Bad -0.03* -0.11* 0.63* -0.02   
6. CG 0.30* 0.43* -0.33* -0.18* -0.24*   
7. Closeheld -0.22* -0.31* 0.02 -0.01 0.03* -0.34*   
8. Size 0.23* 0.21* -0.01 -0.04* 0.03* 0.01 -0.09*   
9. Lev 0.06* 0.11* -0.01 -0.02* 0.01 0.04* -0.07* 0.11*  
10. Volatility -0.03* 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.03* -0.04* 0.05* -0.31* -0.01 
11. Common 0.27* 0.37* -0.34* -0.18* -0.25* 0.67* -0.16* -0.19* -0.01 0.05
*
12. Crosslist 0.18* 0.24* -0.13* -0.08* -0.09* 0.30* -0.21* 0.35* 0.04* -0.02
13. Good News 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06* -0.02 0.00 -0.06* 0.14* -0.01 -0.02
*
 
Panel B: Variables in the Prices Analysis (N = 26,126) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1. T     
2. Tdef 0.94*    
3. Tgood 0.27* 0.28*   
4. Tbad 0.27* 0.28* 0.67*   
5. Tall 0.31* 0.32* 0.91* 0.91*   
6. CG 0.12* 0.12* 0.15* 0.15* 0.16*   
7. Closeheld 0.05* 0.06* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.30*   
8. Size -0.32* -0.33* -0.06* 0.00 -0.04* 0.00 -0.15*   
9. Lev 0.08* 0.06* 0.09* 0.07* 0.09* 0.28* -0.16* -0.13*  
10. Volatility 0.42* 0.43* -0.09* -0.09* -0.10* 0.02* 0.08* -0.43* 0.00 
11. Common 0.15* 0.16* 0.07* 0.05* 0.06* 0.62* -0.21* -0.31* 0.36* 0.14
*
12. Crosslist -0.02* -0.03* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* 0.29* -0.21* 0.33* 0.03* -0.02
13. Good News -0.10* -0.08* -0.12* -0.11* -0.12* -0.03* -0.05* 0.12* -0.04* -0.00
Note: Common is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the country has a common law legal origin which is sourced 
from La Porta et al. (1998). Other variables as defined in Table 2. For variables 1 to 10, product moment 
correlations are reported between continuous firm-level variables. For variables 11 to 13, point-biserial 
correlations are reported between categorical and continuous variables. Note in Panel B, point bi-serial 
correlations for Crosslist and the other continuous variables are for a reduced sample excluding the USA 




Table 4: The Relationship Between Corporate Governance, Disclosure and Timeliness 
 
Dependent Variable: Ldocs Tdocs Tdef Tall 
Column No: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CG 0.103*** -0.012*** 0.003** 0.004*** 
Closeheld -0.018 -0.004** 0.001 -0.002** 
Common 0.686*** 0.013** -0.004* -0.005** 
Common·CG -0.027 -0.006* 0.002 -0.001 
Common·Closeheld -0.071*** -0.002 0.001 0.001 
Crosslist 0.070 -0.004   
Crosslist·CG -0.083** -0.010***   
Goodnews -0.024 0.004** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
Size 0.283*** -0.004** -0.014*** -0.005*** 
Lev 0.057*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.003*** 
Volatility 0.068*** -0.001 0.025*** -0.013*** 
Govei 0.089*** -0.017*** 0.000 -0.001** 
IDV -0.123*** 0.004 0.001 0.001 
UAI -0.045 0.023*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 
Internet 0.245*** 0.011*** -0.003*** -0.001** 
Stmkcap -0.327*** -0.001 0.001 0.001** 
Audit 0.007 0.011*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
Enforce 0.065* -0.013*** 0.002** 0.005*** 
GDPPC 0.016 -0.012*** -0.001 -0.004*** 
Intercept 3.947*** 0.516*** 0.132*** 0.519*** 
F-test 60.76*** 64.21*** 251.42*** 378.69*** 
Adj. R2 0.43 0.21 0.31 0.35 
N 7,541 7,541 26,126 26,126 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (one-tailed t-tests for hypothesised effects and two-tailed t-tests for 
control variables) 
Note: All coefficients relate to variables that have been standardized to assist interpretation. The 
sample comprises firms with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008 covered by 
the ISS Database. For details of country coverage see Table 1. Results are estimated using pooled 
cross section and time series regression fitted by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors 
robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity. All standard errors are clustered by firm. Govei measures 
the extent of government involvement (a higher value means less government involvement), IDV and 
UAI are cultural constructs from Hofstede (2015): IDV is Individualism and UAI is Uncertainty 
Avoidance. Internet represents information dissemination and is measured as the natural log of 
internet users per 100 people, Stmkcap is stock market development measured as stock market 
capitalisation divided by Gross Domestic Product, Audit and Enforce are the audit and enforcement 
indices from Brown et al. (2014) and GDPPC is economic development measured as the natural log 
of GDP per capita based upon purchasing power parity in USD. Other variables are as previously 
defined. Additional details on variable measurement and data sources are provided in the Appendix 






Table 5: The Relation Between Corporate Governance and Timeliness of Documents and Prices 
in Good and Bad Times 
 
Dependent Variable: Tdocs Good Tdocs Bad Tgood Tbad 
Column No: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CG -0.018*** -0.006* 0.004*** 0.003** 
Closeheld -0.005* -0.005 -0.002*** -0.001 
Common 0.003 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.001 
Common·CG 0.005 -0.012** -0.000 -0.002 
Common·Closeheld -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Crosslist -0.001 -0.008   
Crosslist·CG -0.008* -0.010**   
Size -0.007*** 0.001 -0.008*** -0.002*** 
Lev -0.002 0.003* 0.004*** 0.003*** 
Volatility 0.001 -0.002 -0.014*** -0.012*** 
Govei -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.001 -0.002** 
IDV 0.019*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
UAI 0.020*** 0.021*** -0.003*** -0.002* 
Internet 0.006** 0.007*** -0.002** -0.001** 
Stmkcap 0.010*** -0.000 0.002*** 0.001 
Audit 0.007 0.017*** -0.003* -0.008*** 
Enforce -0.013*** -0.012*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 
GDPPC -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
Intercept 0.516*** 0.516*** 0.520*** 0.518*** 
F-test 21.38*** 24.63*** 301.71*** 331.17*** 
Adj. R2 0.08 0.10 0.29 0.30 
N 7,541 7,541 26,126 26,126 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (one-tailed t-tests for hypothesised effects and two-tailed t-tests for 
control variables) 
Note: All coefficients relate to variables that have been standardized to assist interpretation. The 
sample comprises firms with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008 covered by 
the ISS Database. For details of country coverage see Table 1. Results are estimated using pooled 
cross section and time series regression fitted by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors 
robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity. All standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables are as 
previously defined. Additional details on variable measurement and data sources are provided in the 
Appendix Table A:1.  
 
 
